Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil: The Hard Way (002)



Note:
Nietzsche is difficult to understand. These writings are an attempt for myself to become better acquainted with his concepts. It is also a space for others to learn and converse in the subject matter. I don't have a degree in philosophy; most of my knowledge is the result of self-study. If you find something incorrect or inaccurate with my interpretations, please comment and we can learn together.



"HOW COULD anything originate out of its opposite? For example, truth out of error? or the Will to Truth out of the will to deception? or the generous deed out of selfishness? or the pure sun-bright vision of the wise man out of covetousness? Such genesis is impossible; whoever dreams of it is a fool, nay, worse than a fool; things of the highest value must have a different origin, an origin of THEIR own—in this transitory, seductive, illusory, paltry world, in this turmoil of delusion and cupidity, they cannot have their source. But rather in the lap of Being, in the intransitory, in the concealed God, in the 'Thing-in-itself—THERE must be their source, and nowhere else!"

Note that this first section is in quotes. This is not Nietzsche speaking, but instead, how Nietzsche interprets the "metaphysicians of all times."



Metaphysicians (according to Nietzsche) divide reality into two worlds:

  1. the subjective, "transitory, seductive, illusory..." world

  2. the objective "lap of Being, ...intransitory...." world



The subjective world is full of deception and illusion and contains no real Truth.



The objective world, on the other hand, creates the highest, eternal values (e.g. truth, generous deeds, wisdom) that guide Truth.



For example, Kant claims the existence of "thing-in-itself," where we can only know a thing by its appearances, but not the thing itself. The thing itself exists in an alternate realm that we cannot directly experience.



This mode of reasoning discloses the typical prejudice by which metaphysicians of all times can be recognized, this mode of valuation is at the back of all their logical procedure; through this "belief" of theirs, they exert themselves for their "knowledge," for something that is in the end solemnly christened "the Truth." The fundamental belief of metaphysicians is THE BELIEF IN ANTITHESES OF VALUES. It never occurred even to the wariest of them to doubt here on the very threshold (where doubt, however, was most necessary); though they had made a solemn vow, "DE OMNIBUS DUBITANDUM."

Everything metaphysicians have discovered presupposes this prejudice. It looms in the background of all logical procedures. And it explains why they are so preoccupied with attaining knowledge: That truth exists "out there" to be discovered.



The metaphysicians believe in the clear divide between illusion/deception/falsehood and truth. This is the "antitheses of values."



But despite making the solemn vow "De Omnibus Dubitandum" (Descartes' "all is to be doubted"), they have not doubted this idea of opposites, which is essential to their theory of truth.





For it may be doubted, firstly, whether antitheses exist at all; and secondly, whether the popular valuations and antitheses of value upon which metaphysicians have set their seal, are not perhaps merely superficial estimates, merely provisional perspectives, besides being probably made from some corner, perhaps from below—"frog perspectives," as it were, to borrow an expression current among painters. In spite of all the value which may belong to the true, the positive, and the unselfish, it might be possible that a higher and more fundamental value for life generally should be assigned to pretence, to the will to delusion, to selfishness, and cupidity. It might even be possible that WHAT constitutes the value of those good and respected things, consists precisely in their being insidiously related, knotted, and crocheted to these evil and apparently opposed things—perhaps even in being essentially identical with them. Perhaps!

Since the metaphysicians won't doubt themselves, let us doubt for them. First we can doubt whether opposites (antitheses) exist at all. The prejudice which grounds the belief of metaphysicians are "merely provisional perspectives". Nietzsche's expression "frog perspectives" means a narrow minded opinion (not seeing the whole picture).



What constitutes value of "good" things are their being related to "evil" things. Objectivity truth is only valuable when it's contextualized in subjectivity. "Good" cannot exist without "Evil." All opposing forces seem to be dependent on one another, and perhaps should we say, they are identical?





But who wishes to concern himself with such dangerous "Perhapses"! For that investigation one must await the advent of a new order of philosophers, such as will have other tastes and inclinations, the reverse of those hitherto prevalent—philosophers of the dangerous "Perhaps" in every sense of the term.



These new questions require a new kind of philosopher, one that overcomes the prejudices of past metaphysicians.





And to speak in all seriousness, I see such new philosophers beginning to appear.

To reply you need to sign in.