Note:Nietzsche is difficult to understand. These writings are an attempt for myself to become better acquainted with his concepts. It is also a space for others to learn and converse in the subject matter. I don't have a degree in philosophy; most of my knowledge is the result of self-study. If you find something incorrect or inaccurate with my interpretations, please comment and we can learn together.
That which causes philosophers to be regarded half-distrustfully and half-mockingly, is not the oft-repeated discovery how innocent they are—how often and easily they make mistakes and lose their way, in short, how childish and childlike they are,—but that there is not enough honest dealing with them, whereas they all raise a loud and virtuous outcry when the problem of truthfulness is even hinted at in the remotest manner.
We shouldn't distrust philosophers due to their being human: making mistakes is part of the human nature. In his book "Human All Too Human," Nietzsche writes "Most people are far too much occupied with themselves to be malicious."
So, the philosophers' misguidedness is not intended to be malicious, but only a way for them to deal with their own problems. Fine. But what is malicious is their wanting to profess this philosophy to others as the objective Truth.
They all pose as though their real opinions had been discovered and attained through the self-evolving of a cold, pure, divinely indifferent dialectic (in contrast to all sorts of mystics, who, fairer and foolisher, talk of "inspiration"), whereas, in fact, a prejudiced proposition, idea, or "suggestion," which is generally their heart's desire abstracted and refined, is defended by them with arguments sought out after the event.
Philosophers like Kant and Hegel believe their philosophies can explain all absolute truth through reason. To them, Reason is a purely objective, "cold, divine, indifferent dialect" that must be taken as Truth (similar to how we must accept 2 + 2 = 4). However, their retreat to reason is simply a remedy to ease their own hearts. Why do they have such a strong desire to explain everything through Reason?
They are all advocates who do not wish to be regarded as such, generally astute defenders, also, of their prejudices, which they dub "truths,"—and VERY far from having the conscience which bravely admits this to itself, very far from having the good taste of the courage which goes so far as to let this be understood, perhaps to warn friend or foe, or in cheerful confidence and self-ridicule.
Philosophers are advocates of their own prejudices, and they are not courageous and honest enough to admit it at the outset.
The spectacle of the Tartuffery of old Kant, equally stiff and decent, with which he entices us into the dialectic by-ways that lead (more correctly mislead) to his "categorical imperative"—makes us fastidious ones smile, we who find no small amusement in spying out the subtle tricks of old moralists and ethical preachers. Or, still more so, the hocus-pocus in mathematical form, by means of which Spinoza has, as it were, clad his philosophy in mail and mask—in fact, the "love of HIS wisdom," to translate the term fairly and squarely—in order thereby to strike terror at once into the heart of the assailant who should dare to cast a glance on that invincible maiden, that Pallas Athene:—how much of personal timidity and vulnerability does this masquerade of a sickly recluse betray!
The grand, complex narratives of Kant and Spinoza entice us with "mathematical form" and "dialectic by-ways" that ultimately lead to eternal Truths. But if we take a closer look at Kant and Spinoza themselves, we must admit they are sick. For who would have created such intimidating spectacles in the first place to simply justify human nature? If they were happy and healthy beings, then there would have been no need for such categorical imperatives!
(The Categorical Imperative is one of Kant's central concepts which attempts to explain a moral philosophy with pure reason. In simplified form, it can be explained as "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law.") [1]
In his book "Twilight of the Idols," Nietzsche takes a similar stab at Socrates. He argues that Socrates had bad instincts, and these bad instincts led him to live a miserable life. And the only way for him to escape this miserable life was to retreat to reason and reflection (away from instinct).
Nietzsche is notorious for ad hominem arguments. What does this say about Nietzche?
Notes:
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Categorical_imperative
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