Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil: The Hard Way (015)

To study physiology with a clear conscience, one must insist on the fact that the sense-organs are not phenomena in the sense of the idealistic philosophy; as such they certainly could not be causes! Sensualism, therefore, at least as regulative hypothesis, if not as heuristic principle.

Idealism asserts that consciousness is logically prior to material phenomena. Therefore, to order to study physiology in the idealistic sense, we would need to assert that our sense organs are a product of the mind. But this seems wrong because our sense organs, according to physiology, produce our sensual experience. Therefore Sensualism acts as a sort of "regulative hypothesis."



What? And others say even that the external world is the work of our organs? But then our body, as a part of this external world, would be the work of our organs! But then our organs themselves would be the work of our organs! It seems to me that this is a complete REDUCTIO AD ABSURDUM, if the conception CAUSA SUI is something fundamentally absurd. Consequently, the external world is NOT the work of our organs—?

After having found a contradiction in the idealistic view of physiology, Nietzsche turns to a physicalist view. In this view, our body (not the mind) senses the sense-organs. But that would mean that sensual experience of our sense organs are the result of our sense organs. Nietzsche believes this to be a chicken-egg problem, and ultimately absurd.



So is our experience of the external world due to our mind or our organs? Nietzsche doesn't have a good answer.

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