Nietzsche is difficult to understand. This archive is an attempt for myself to become better acquainted with his concepts. It is also a space for others to learn and converse about the subject matter. I don't have a degree in philosophy; I've taken a couple classes, but most of my knowledge is the result of self-study. If you find something incorrect or inaccurate with my interpretations, please comment and we can learn together.

The translation I'm using is by Helen Zimmern because it is 

 . If you decide to buy Beyond Good and Evil, I recommend the Walter Kaufmann translation. I will be cross-referencing Zimmern's translation with Kaufmann as I write my analysis.

Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil: The Hard Way

O sancta simplicitas! In what strange simplification and falsification man lives! One can never cease wondering when once one has got eyes for beholding this marvel! How we have made everything around us clear and free and easy and simple! how we have been able to give our senses a passport to everything superficial, our thoughts a godlike desire for wanton pranks and wrong inferences!—how from the beginning, we have contrived to retain our ignorance in order to enjoy an almost inconceivable freedom, thoughtlessness, imprudence, heartiness, and gaiety—in order to enjoy life! 

Man has comported his way of being towards a lifestyle that tends towards errors: he accepts such things as atomism and free-will as necessary components of life. However, when further investigated, these concepts contain no objective truth whatsoever. So why do we have such tendencies to believe in these concepts?

Man retains this dominating ignorance as a tool in order to enjoy life... to an "almost inconceivable freedom, thoughtlessness, imprudence, and gaiety". Man's convictions are not objectively necessary, they are only necessary for a certain way of life.

And only on this solidified, granite-like foundation of ignorance could knowledge rear itself hitherto, the will to knowledge on the foundation of a far more powerful will, the will to ignorance, to the uncertain, to the untrue! Not as its opposite, but—as its refinement! 

The will to ignorance is more powerful than our will to knowledge. It presupposes it. Every knowledge seeking is backed by an appeal to live a life towards simplicity.

It is to be hoped, indeed, that LANGUAGE, here as elsewhere, will not get over its awkwardness, and that it will continue to talk of opposites where there are only degrees and many refinements of gradation; it is equally to be hoped that the incarnated Tartuffery of morals, which now belongs to our unconquerable "flesh and blood," will turn the words round in the mouths of us discerning ones. Here and there we understand it, and laugh at the way in which precisely the best knowledge seeks most to retain us in this SIMPLIFIED, thoroughly artificial, suitably imagined, and suitably falsified world: at the way in which, whether it will or not, it loves error, because, as living itself, it loves life!

This simplicitly is deeply embedded in the most fundamental ideas: Language and Morality.

The free spirit and “discerning ones” can sometimes catch these errors escaping from their own mouths. And when this happens, all they can do is observe these human-all-too-human tendencies and laugh. 

It is easy to fall into these traps of unfounded assumptions. But sometimes we can catch ourselves. And when that happens, we can laugh at ourselves and our attempts at constructing our own artificial, simplified, and sheltered world.

The free spirit loves laughing at itself; it loves when it overcomes its own desire for the false, simplified life. "...as living itself, it loves life!" 

Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil: The Hard Way (024)

O sancta simplicitas! In what strange simplification and falsification man lives! One can never cease wondering when once one has got eyes for beholding this marvel! How we have made everything around us clear and free and easy and simple!

All psychology hitherto has run aground on moral prejudices and timidities, it has not dared to launch out into the depths. In so far as it is allowable to recognize in that which has hitherto been written, evidence of that which has hitherto been kept silent, it seems as if nobody had yet harboured the notion of psychology as the Morphology and DEVELOPMENT-DOCTRINE OF THE WILL TO POWER, as I conceive of it. 

Psychology too has been polluted by moral prejudices. No one has yet revealed the inconspicuous natures of these drives until now. The freeing of psychology from morality could reveal the fundamental drive called “the Will to Power."

The power of moral prejudices has penetrated deeply into the most intellectual world, the world apparently most indifferent and unprejudiced, and has obviously operated in an injurious, obstructive, blinding, and distorting manner. A proper physio-psychology has to contend with unconscious antagonism in the heart of the investigator, it has "the heart" against it even a doctrine of the reciprocal conditionalness of the "good" and the "bad" impulses, causes (as refined immorality) distress and aversion in a still strong and manly conscience—still more so, a doctrine of the derivation of all good impulses from bad ones. 

Moral prejudices are deeply embedded in even the most intellectual pursuits. It has operated in a "injurious, obstructive, blinding, and distorting manner." 

In all pursuits of truth, there must be a questioner. This questioner harbors moral prejudices that subconsciously  guide his questions (and answers). Despite this, the questioner believes to be following a purely logical, objective path to his truth. 

Even a questioner with a “still strong and manly conscience” experiences distress and aversion in the face of his own moral prejudices. In order to overcome moral prejudices, we must take into account our own “good” and “bad” impulses at the outset of our investigations.

If, however, a person should regard even the emotions of hatred, envy, covetousness, and imperiousness as life-conditioning emotions, as factors which must be present, fundamentally and essentially, in the general economy of life (which must, therefore, be further developed if life is to be further developed), he will suffer from such a view of things as from sea-sickness. And yet this hypothesis is far from being the strangest and most painful in this immense and almost new domain of dangerous knowledge, and there are in fact a hundred good reasons why every one should keep away from it who CAN do so! 

If a man dwells in his “hatred, envy, covetousness, and imperiousness” and convinces himself of their necessity, he will grow sick. We learn to rely on such emotions, granting us a worldview of suffering and decadence. 

On the other hand, if one has once drifted hither with one's bark, well! very good! now let us set our teeth firmly! let us open our eyes and keep our hand fast on the helm! We sail away right OVER morality, we crush out, we destroy perhaps the remains of our own morality by daring to make our voyage thither—but what do WE matter. Never yet did a PROFOUNDER world of insight reveal itself to daring travelers and adventurers, and the psychologist who thus "makes a sacrifice"—it is not the sacrifizio dell' intelletto, on the contrary!—will at least be entitled to demand in return that psychology shall once more be recognized as the queen of the sciences, for whose service and equipment the other sciences exist. For psychology is once more the path to the fundamental problems.

If we don't cling to our emotions, and instead take them as what they are (our moral prejudices), then we are in some new way free. We cast our ship off into the unknown depths of the sea, sailing away from morality. 

Then where are we heading? It is not known; we are adventurers. We must sacrifice the shelter which morality has granted us and sail out into the unknown.

In doing so, we are not “sacrificing the intellect;" on the contrary: we are removing old polluted values that are no longer useful for us (now that we know they are infected with prejudices). We start afresh with a new psychology that overcomes morality. Such a psychology could undermine our decadent way of viewing the world and rediscovering the fundamental problems.

Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil: The Hard Way (023)

All psychology hitherto has run aground on moral prejudices and timidities, it has not dared to launch out into the depths. In so far as it is allowable to recognize in that which has hitherto been written, evidence of that which has hitherto been kept silent

Let me be pardoned, as an old philologist who cannot desist from the mischief of putting his finger on bad modes of interpretation, but "Nature's conformity to law," of which you physicists talk so proudly, as though—why, it exists only owing to your interpretation and bad "philology." It is no matter of fact, no "text," but rather just a naively humanitarian adjustment and perversion of meaning, with which you make abundant concessions to the democratic instincts of the modern soul! "Everywhere equality before the law—Nature is not different in that respect, nor better than we": a fine instance of secret motive, in which the vulgar antagonism to everything privileged and autocratic—likewise a second and more refined atheism—is once more disguised. "Ni dieu, ni maitre"—that, also, is what you want; and therefore "Cheers for natural law!"

Before turning towards philosophy, Nietzsche studied as a classical philologist. His work involved interpreting ancient Greco-Roman language and literature.

Nietzsche attacks physicists for their pride towards “Nature's conformity to law." They take this conformity to be interpreted as a fact which justifies equality. And equality acts as their true ulterior motive: promotion of modern democratic values: “nature is no different and no better off than we are in this regard," they might say.

What is equality? To Nietzsche, it is a hostility towards everything privileged.

“Ni dieu, ni maitre” translates to “Neither God nor master." The physicists are introducing a new kind of atheism (science and nature) that is built on top of equality. No master; everyone is the same.

—is it not so? But, as has been said, that is interpretation, not text; and somebody might come along, who, with opposite intentions and modes of interpretation, could read out of the same "Nature," and with regard to the same phenomena, just the tyrannically inconsiderate and relentless enforcement of the claims of power—an interpreter who should so place the unexceptionalness and unconditionalness of all "Will to Power" before your eyes, that almost every word, and the word "tyranny" itself, would eventually seem unsuitable, or like a weakening and softening metaphor—as being too human; and who should, nevertheless, end by asserting the same about this world as you do, namely, that it has a "necessary" and "calculable" course, NOT, however, because laws obtain in it, but because they are absolutely LACKING, and every power effects its ultimate consequences every moment. Granted that this also is only interpretation—and you will be eager enough to make this objection?—well, so much the better.

The way physicists perceive Nature is not, in any way, a fact; it is an interpretation. Someone could interpret the Nature as the opposite: “a tyrannically ruthless and relentless imposition of power claims." And despite the difference in interpretation, this someone could believe, just as much as the physicists, that his conclusions are both necessary and calculable. 

This interpreter would interpret power and its inequality as the driving forces behind Nature. And it is not because laws govern Nature, but because laws are absolutely lacking.

But this too, our commentary on the interpretation of Nature, is also an interpretation. And one may object to that, as well. "well, so much the better."

Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil: The Hard Way (022)


Let me be pardoned, as an old philologist who cannot desist from the mischief of putting his finger on bad modes of interpretation, but "Nature's conformity to law," of which you physicists talk so proudly, as though

The CAUSA SUI is the best self-contradiction that has yet been conceived, it is a sort of logical violation and unnaturalness; but the extravagant pride of man has managed to entangle itself profoundly and frightfully with this very folly. The desire for "freedom of will" in the superlative, metaphysical sense, such as still holds sway, unfortunately, in the minds of the half-educated, the desire to bear the entire and ultimate responsibility for one's actions oneself, and to absolve God, the world, ancestors, chance, and society therefrom, involves nothing less than to be precisely this CAUSA SUI, and, with more than Munchausen daring, to pull oneself up into existence by the hair, out of the slough of nothingness. If any one should find out in this manner the crass stupidity of the celebrated conception of "free will" and put it out of his head altogether, I beg of him to carry his "enlightenment" a step further, and also put out of his head the contrary of this monstrous conception of "free will": I mean "non-free will," which is tantamount to a misuse of cause and effect. 

Some human drives and beliefs are built upon self-contradictions. For example, 

, the idea that a thing can be its own cause, is a self-contradiction that has led the “half-educated” to believe in the argument for free will. They desire to act with full responsibility, absolving God or Culture from any influence on them whatsoever.

The arguments of "free will" and “unfree will” are logically invalid (causa sui), and yet it is a desire that has contributed to the formation of values.

One should not wrongly MATERIALISE "cause" and "effect," as the natural philosophers do (and whoever like them naturalize in thinking at present), according to the prevailing mechanical doltishness which makes the cause press and push until it "effects" its end; one should use "cause" and "effect" only as pure CONCEPTIONS, that is to say, as conventional fictions for the purpose of designation and mutual understanding,—NOT for explanation. In "being-in-itself" there is nothing of "casual-connection," of "necessity," or of "psychological non-freedom"; there the effect does NOT follow the cause, there "law" does not obtain. It is WE alone who have devised cause, sequence, reciprocity, relativity, constraint, number, law, freedom, motive, and purpose; and when we interpret and intermix this symbol-world, as "being-in-itself," with things, we act once more as we have always acted—MYTHOLOGICALLY. The "non-free will" is mythology; in real life it is only a question of STRONG and WEAK wills.—

Why is “free will” a causa sui? Free Will is the idea that one causes one's own actions.  However, there is no real, physical thing called “cause and effect." Cause and Effect is a concept we use to understand and characterize the world, not to explain it.  Therefore, to apply cause and effect as a way of explaining one's agency (in-itself) makes no sense.

We created cause and effect. Then, one day, our imagination forgets that we've created it and asserts free will, confusing the symbol-world (cause and effect) with the physical world (in-itself). It's remarkable how simple misinterpretations can lead to hundreds of years of wasted thought.

It is almost always a symptom of what is lacking in himself, when a thinker, in every "causal-connection" and "psychological necessity," manifests something of compulsion, indigence, obsequiousness, oppression, and non-freedom; it is suspicious to have such feelings—the person betrays himself. And in general, if I have observed correctly, the "non-freedom of the will" is regarded as a problem from two entirely opposite standpoints, but always in a profoundly PERSONAL manner: some will not give up their "responsibility," their belief in THEMSELVES, the personal right to THEIR merits, at any price (the vain races belong to this class); others on the contrary, do not wish to be answerable for anything, or blamed for anything, and owing to an inward self-contempt, seek to GET OUT OF THE BUSINESS, no matter how. The latter, when they write books, are in the habit at present of taking the side of criminals; a sort of socialistic sympathy is their favourite disguise. And as a matter of fact, the fatalism of the weak-willed embellishes itself surprisingly when it can pose as "la religion de la souffrance humaine"; that is ITS "good taste."

We all encounter the feeling that “something must be done." It is as if we did not have a choice. This feeling is suspicious to Nietzsche and can be described in two personal manners:

 individuals believe in the “unfree will," and therefore are not responsible for anything. Even criminals are not guilty; they are not responsible either! Since no one is responsible, they tend to sympathize with everyone, leaning towards a socialistic compassion. These individuals live under the “religion of human suffering,” on account of this "unfree will". 

And yet, before, we proved that “free will” is not a real in-itself thing, but a creation of our own minds. Therefore, these individuals have chosen a life of suffering, and they believe it to be good and necessary! 

Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil: The Hard Way (021)


The CAUSA SUI is the best self-contradiction that has yet been conceived, it is a sort of logical violation and unnaturalness; but the extravagant pride of man has managed to entangle itself profoundly and frightfully with this very folly.

That the separate philosophical ideas are not anything optional or autonomously evolving, but grow up in connection and relationship with each other, that, however suddenly and arbitrarily they seem to appear in the history of thought, they nevertheless belong just as much to a system as the collective members of the fauna of a Continent—is betrayed in the end by the circumstance: how unfailingly the most diverse philosophers always fill in again a definite fundamental scheme of POSSIBLE philosophies. 

There is no such thing as an isolated philosophy. All philosophies are relative to one another. The tradition is grounded in an evolution, relating-to and connected-with the contextual familiarity within the age from which it sprung. 

Under an invisible spell, they always revolve once more in the same orbit, however independent of each other they may feel themselves with their critical or systematic wills, something within them leads them, something impels them in definite order the one after the other—to wit, the innate methodology and relationship of their ideas. Their thinking is, in fact, far less a discovery than a re-recognizing, a remembering, a return and a home-coming to a far-off, ancient common-household of the soul, out of which those ideas formerly grew: philosophizing is so far a kind of atavism of the highest order. 

At first glance, philosophies appear diverse. Each uses its own terminology and concepts to discover so-called truth. Despite their differences, they all originate from the same “invisible spell": the drive to recapture the primordial roots from which it grew. Philosophy is not a discovery, it is a remembering of the most basic concepts.

The wonderful family resemblance of all Indian, Greek, and German philosophizing is easily enough explained. In fact, where there is affinity of language, owing to the common philosophy of grammar—I mean owing to the unconscious domination and guidance of similar grammatical functions—it cannot but be that everything is prepared at the outset for a similar development and succession of philosophical systems, just as the way seems barred against certain other possibilities of world-interpretation. It is highly probable that philosophers within the domain of the Ural-Altaic languages (where the conception of the subject is least developed) look otherwise "into the world," and will be found on paths of thought different from those of the Indo-Germans and Mussulmans, the spell of certain grammatical functions is ultimately also the spell of PHYSIOLOGICAL valuations and racial conditions.—So much by way of rejecting Locke's superficiality with regard to the origin of ideas.

What is one of the most basic concepts? Language.

Philosophies founded on similar languages share similar patterns of thought. Language provides the foundation out of which philosophy grows. Nietzsche argues that a study of language can explain why certain philosophies exist (and why other philosophies do not!). 

For example, Ural-Altaic languages (which do not define subject/object relationships) will most likely devise alternative philosophies to those of the Germanic tradition. And not only philosophies, but value systems. Maybe our cultural circumstance can be attributed to the grammatical function of languages.

Language is also dynamic. "...I mean thanks to the unconscious rule of leadership of the same grammatical functions..." Our language today is not random. Our grammar, words, definitions are the result of a highly dynamic genealogy of power relations between drives over time (see Aphorism 019). 

which attempts to explain the origin of ideas. He argues that all ideas come from experience, and language resulted as the attempt to communicate these ideas. Nietzsche is claiming the opposite: values and ideas resulted from language.

Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil: The Hard Way (020

That the separate philosophical ideas are not anything optional or autonomously evolving, but grow up in connection and relationship with each other, that, however suddenly and arbitrarily they seem to appear in the history of thought, they nevertheless belong just as much to a system as the collective members of the fauna of a Continent

Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil: The Hard Way (020)

Philosophers are accustomed to speak of the will as though it were the best-known thing in the world; indeed, Schopenhauer has given us to understand that the will alone is really known to us, absolutely and completely known, without deduction or addition. But it again and again seems to me that in this case Schopenhauer also only did what philosophers are in the habit of doing—he seems to have adopted a POPULAR PREJUDICE and exaggerated it. Willing seems to me to be above all something COMPLICATED, something that is a unity only in name—and it is precisely in a name that popular prejudice lurks, which has got the mastery over the inadequate precautions of philosophers in all ages. 

Philosophy tends to exaggerate simple, popular concepts. Simple, elegant theories, at the outset, appear too beautiful to corrupt with rational interrogation. And instead, we accept them at face value as “immediate certainties." (see Aphorism 16). 

For example, Schopenhauer presents “the will” as a fundamental, atomistic force that is simply known to us. For Schopenhauer, no serious explanations are required to justify this will; it is self-evident and obvious.

Nietzsche disagrees. The will is invariably complicated. In the next paragraphs, he attempts to dissect will and reveal its complexity.

So let us for once be more cautious, let us be "unphilosophical": let us say that in all willing there is firstly a plurality of sensations, namely, the sensation of the condition "AWAY FROM WHICH we go," the sensation of the condition "TOWARDS WHICH we go," the sensation of this "FROM" and "TOWARDS" itself, and then besides, an accompanying muscular sensation, which, even without our putting in motion "arms and legs," commences its action by force of habit, directly we "will" anything. Therefore, just as sensations (and indeed many kinds of sensations) are to be recognized as ingredients of the will, so, in the second place, thinking is also to be recognized; in every act of the will there is a ruling thought;—and let us not imagine it possible to sever this thought from the "willing," as if the will would then remain over! In the third place, the will is not only a complex of sensation and thinking, but it is above all an EMOTION, and in fact the emotion of the command. That which is termed "freedom of the will" is essentially the emotion of supremacy in respect to him who must obey: "I am free, 'he' must obey"—this consciousness is inherent in every will; and equally so the straining of the attention, the straight look which fixes itself exclusively on one thing, the unconditional judgment that "this and nothing else is necessary now," the inward certainty that obedience will be rendered—and whatever else pertains to the position of the commander. A man who WILLS commands something within himself which renders obedience, or which he believes renders obedience.

Let's discard the idea of the “simple” will and, instead, investigate its complexity:

But now let us notice what is the strangest thing about the will,—this affair so extremely complex, for which the people have only one name. Inasmuch as in the given circumstances we are at the same time the commanding AND the obeying parties, and as the obeying party we know the sensations of constraint, impulsion, pressure, resistance, and motion, which usually commence immediately after the act of will; inasmuch as, on the other hand, we are accustomed to disregard this duality, and to deceive ourselves about it by means of the synthetic term "I": a whole series of erroneous conclusions, and consequently of false judgments about the will itself, has become attached to the act of willing—to such a degree that he who wills believes firmly that willing SUFFICES for action. Since in the majority of cases there has only been exercise of will when the effect of the command—consequently obedience, and therefore action—was to be EXPECTED, the APPEARANCE has translated itself into the sentiment, as if there were a NECESSITY OF EFFECT; in a word, he who wills believes with a fair amount of certainty that will and action are somehow one; he ascribes the success, the carrying out of the willing, to the will itself, and thereby enjoys an increase of the sensation of power which accompanies all success. 

The “will” is not simple. In willing, we are both the commander and the obeyer. As an obeyer, we feel constraint, pressure, resistance. But as a commander, we deceive ourselves into the worthwhileness of our willing;  we believe in its value. The will represents this commanding “I” who believes in the necessity of action. This acting and willing are so inter-connected, that some (Schopenhauer) reduce it into one: acting is willing. 

"Freedom of Will"—that is the expression for the complex state of delight of the person exercising volition, who commands and at the same time identifies himself with the executor of the order—who, as such, enjoys also the triumph over obstacles, but thinks within himself that it was really his own will that overcame them. In this way the person exercising volition adds the feelings of delight of his successful executive instruments, the useful "underwills" or under-souls—indeed, our body is but a social structure composed of many souls—to his feelings of delight as commander. L'EFFET C'EST MOI. what happens here is what happens in every well-constructed and happy commonwealth, namely, that the governing class identifies itself with the successes of the commonwealth. In all willing it is absolutely a question of commanding and obeying, on the basis, as already said, of a social structure composed of many "souls", on which account a philosopher should claim the right to include willing-as-such within the sphere of morals—regarded as the doctrine of the relations of supremacy under which the phenomenon of "life" manifests itself.

Our body is a “social structure composed of many souls." In every one of us, there resides numerous desires and drives, all contending for our power. The will is the overcoming of one desire by another through the act of commanding. For example, we might want to eat the chocolate cake (because it is delicious), but our refusal triumphs on account of our desire for health. 

When our willing leads to successful outcomes, we, ourselves, identify with the success. “Leffet C'est Moi” (by Louis XIV) translates as “The effect is me." We become our successes, we attach to the desires that feed our will for success. We are like society, where the ruling classes identifies itself with the successes of the commonwealth.

Therefore, philosophers shouldn't simply take the "will" as an immediate known certainty. Instead, the “will” is complex, and it acts as the ultimate drive behind morality; a power relation that manifests life itself.

Nietzsche's Beyond Good And Evil: The Hard Way (019)

Philosophers are accustomed to speak of the will as though it were the best-known thing in the world; indeed, Schopenhauer has given us to understand that the will alone is really known to us, absolutely and completely known, without deduction or addition.

It is certainly not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable; it is precisely thereby that it attracts the more subtle minds. It seems that the hundred-times-refuted theory of the "free will" owes its persistence to this charm alone; some one is always appearing who feels himself strong enough to refute it.

In this short passage, Nietzsche argues that the self-preservation of theories is a function of their refutability. Intellects love to refute theories; to flex their muscles around an incomplete knowledge-space. It's no wonder why the theory of “free will” is so popular (and has been around forever!). There is always someone willing to take on the challenge of refuting it! Or, perhaps, refuting its refutation!

Nietzsche's Beyond Good And Evil: The Hard Way (018)


It is certainly not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable; it is precisely thereby that it attracts the more subtle minds.

With regard to the superstitions of logicians, I shall never tire of emphasizing a small, terse fact, which is unwillingly recognized by these credulous minds—namely, that a thought comes when "it" wishes, and not when "I" wish; so that it is a PERVERSION of the facts of the case to say that the subject "I" is the condition of the predicate "think." ONE thinks; but that this "one" is precisely the famous old "ego," is, to put it mildly, only a supposition, an assertion, and assuredly not an "immediate certainty." After all, one has even gone too far with this "one thinks"—even the "one" contains an INTERPRETATION of the process, and does not belong to the process itself. One infers here according to the usual grammatical formula—"To think is an activity; every activity requires an agency that is active; consequently"... 

Nietzsche continues to attack “I think." He argues that thoughts appear in the mind when “they want," not when the subject, “I” decides to think those thoughts. It is therefore incorrect to say that "one thinks those thoughts."

Maybe our willingness to accept this falsification of “I think” is merely a grammatical one: thinking is an activity, and every activity must have its actor.

It was pretty much on the same lines that the older atomism sought, besides the operating "power," the material particle wherein it resides and out of which it operates—the atom. More rigorous minds, however, learnt at last to get along without this "earth-residuum," and perhaps some day we shall accustom ourselves, even from the logician's point of view, to get along without the little "one" (to which the worthy old "ego" has refined itself).

Atomism fell for the same trick. They assumed the atom's existence as self-evident, and created an entire ideology around the idea. But more rigorous minds overcame this idea. Maybe one day we will too overcome this “I think;” this egoism.

Nietzche's Beyond Good and Evil: The Hard Way (017)


With regard to the superstitions of logicians, I shall never tire of emphasizing a small, terse fact, which is unwillingly recognized by these credulous minds—namely, that a thought comes when "it" wishes, and not when "I" wish; so that it is a PERVERSION of the facts of the case to say that the subject "I" is the condition of the predicate "think."

There are still harmless self-observers who believe that there are "immediate certainties"; for instance, "I think," or as the superstition of Schopenhauer puts it, "I will"; as though cognition here got hold of its object purely and simply as "the thing in itself," without any falsification taking place either on the part of the subject or the object. I would repeat it, however, a hundred times, that "immediate certainty," as well as "absolute knowledge" and the "thing in itself," involve a CONTRADICTIO IN ADJECTO; we really ought to free ourselves from the misleading significance of words! 

What do you believe to be self-evidently and absolutely true? 

These "immediate certainties", Nietzsche argues, contain a contradiction in terms. It is merely the clever uses of language that seduce us into believing in such beliefs. 

The people on their part may think that cognition is knowing all about things, but the philosopher must say to himself: "When I analyze the process that is expressed in the sentence, 'I think,' I find a whole series of daring assertions, the argumentative proof of which would be difficult, perhaps impossible: for instance, that it is I who think, that there must necessarily be something that thinks, that thinking is an activity and operation on the part of a being who is thought of as a cause, that there is an 'ego,' and finally, that it is already determined what is to be designated by thinking—that I KNOW what thinking is. For if I had not already decided within myself what it is, by what standard could I determine whether that which is just happening is not perhaps 'willing' or 'feeling'? In short, the assertion 'I think,' assumes that I COMPARE my state at the present moment with other states of myself which I know, in order to determine what it is; on account of this retrospective connection with further 'knowledge,' it has, at any rate, no immediate certainty for me."—

While people may accept such “immediate certainties”, the philosopher will not. He will question and dissect them. Here's an example of an investigation that might occur:

“I think” presupposes some being that causes the thinking, namely "I". It also presupposes that this "I" understands what thinking is, but how do we know what this thinking is? How do we know it is not instead a "feeling"? No, thinking is not some specific grounded state of being; it is instead defined through its relation amongst other states. Thinking is complex; we cannot assume it to be self-evident.

In place of the "immediate certainty" in which the people may believe in the special case, the philosopher thus finds a series of metaphysical questions presented to him, veritable conscience questions of the intellect, to wit: "Whence did I get the notion of 'thinking'? Why do I believe in cause and effect? What gives me the right to speak of an 'ego,' and even of an 'ego' as cause, and finally of an 'ego' as cause of thought?" He who ventures to answer these metaphysical questions at once by an appeal to a sort of INTUITIVE perception, like the person who says, "I think, and know that this, at least, is true, actual, and certain"—will encounter a smile and two notes of interrogation in a philosopher nowadays. "Sir," the philosopher will perhaps give him to understand, "it is improbable that you are not mistaken, but why should it be the truth?"

The philosopher reveals for himself a veritable bundle of metaphysical questions from these "immediate certainties:"

And so philosophers will attempt to provide answers to 

 questions. But isn't this searching for some absolute truth also assume that absolute truth exists?  Is the philosopher, therefore, doing nothing differently than the people who accepted immediate certainties?


There are still harmless self-observers who believe that there are "immediate certainties"; for instance, "I think," or as the superstition of Schopenhauer puts it, "I will"; as though cognition here got hold of its object purely and simply as "the thing in itself," without any falsification taking place either on the part of the subject or the object.

Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil: The Hard Way (016)

To study physiology with a clear conscience, one must insist on the fact that the sense-organs are not phenomena in the sense of the idealistic philosophy; as such they certainly could not be causes! Sensualism, therefore, at least as regulative hypothesis, if not as heuristic principle. 

Idealism asserts that consciousness is logically prior to material phenomena. Therefore, to order to study physiology in the idealistic sense, we would need to assert that our sense organs are a product of the mind. But this seems wrong because our sense organs, according to physiology, produce our sensual experience.  Therefore Sensualism acts as a sort of "regulative hypothesis."

What? And others say even that the external world is the work of our organs? But then our body, as a part of this external world, would be the work of our organs! But then our organs themselves would be the work of our organs! It seems to me that this is a complete REDUCTIO AD ABSURDUM, if the conception CAUSA SUI is something fundamentally absurd. Consequently, the external world is NOT the work of our organs—?

After having found a contradiction in the idealistic view of physiology, Nietzsche turns to a physicalist view. In this view, our body (not the mind) senses the sense-organs. But that would mean that sensual experience of our sense organs are the result of our sense organs. Nietzsche believes this to be a chicken-egg problem, and ultimately absurd.

So is our experience of the external world due to our mind or our organs? Nietzsche doesn't have a good answer.

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To study physiology with a clear conscience, one must insist on the fact that the sense-organs are not phenomena in the sense of the idealistic philosophy; as such they certainly could not be causes!

It is perhaps just dawning on five or six minds that natural philosophy is only a world-exposition and world-arrangement (according to us, if I may say so!) and NOT a world-explanation; but in so far as it is based on belief in the senses, it is regarded as more, and for a long time to come must be regarded as more—namely, as an explanation. It has eyes and fingers of its own, it has ocular evidence and palpableness of its own: this operates fascinatingly, persuasively, and CONVINCINGLY upon an age with fundamentally plebeian tastes—in fact, it follows instinctively the canon of truth of eternal popular sensualism. What is clear, what is "explained"? Only that which can be seen and felt—one must pursue every problem thus far. 

Even physics is not an explanation of the world; it is merely another interpretation of it (by us!). But what is convincing about physics is its reliance on the senses. Knowledge can be proved through experimentation. Physics is a conviction for the importance of sense data.

Obversely, however, the charm of the Platonic mode of thought, which was an ARISTOCRATIC mode, consisted precisely in RESISTANCE to obvious sense-evidence—perhaps among men who enjoyed even stronger and more fastidious senses than our contemporaries, but who knew how to find a higher triumph in remaining masters of them: and this by means of pale, cold, grey conceptional networks which they threw over the motley whirl of the senses—the mob of the senses, as Plato said. 

On the other hand, Platonism was built in retaliation to the obviousness of the senses. Unlike physicists, Platonists wanted to overcome their senses and seek a more eternal truth that was deemed more important. Platonism is the conviction that senses are something to be overcome and the real world lies beyond them.

In this overcoming of the world, and interpreting of the world in the manner of Plato, there was an ENJOYMENT different from that which the physicists of today offer us—and likewise the Darwinists and anti-teleologists among the physiological workers, with their principle of the "smallest possible effort," and the greatest possible blunder. "Where there is nothing more to see or to grasp, there is also nothing more for men to do"—that is certainly an imperative different from the Platonic one, but it may notwithstanding be the right imperative for a hardy, laborious race of machinists and bridge-builders of the future, who have nothing but ROUGH work to perform.

The Platonists enjoyed living in the unknown, living in accordance not with the physical world, but instead the Forms. Science is grounded on the opposite: “where there is nothing more to see or to grasp, there is also nothing more for men to do." Physicists enjoy certainty of everything. Platonists enjoy “going beyond” certainty.

Nietzsche doesn't say which understanding-of-the-world is better, but he does hint that the scientific conception of the world will be the better conviction for the "machinists" and “bridge-builders” of the future. It  is more utilitarian.

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It is perhaps just dawning on five or six minds that natural philosophy is only a world-exposition and world-arrangement (according to us, if I may say so!) and NOT a world-explanation

Psychologists should bethink themselves before putting down the instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic being. A living thing seeks above all to DISCHARGE its strength—life itself is WILL TO POWER; self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent RESULTS thereof. In short, here, as everywhere else, let us beware of SUPERFLUOUS teleological principles!—one of which is the instinct of self-preservation (we owe it to Spinoza's inconsistency). It is thus, in effect, that method ordains, which must be essentially economy of principles.


Here, Nietzsche argues against the idea that survival-of-the-fittest (Darwin) is the driving force behind life. Instead, he argues that survival-of-the-fittest is only a consequence of a more fundamental force: the Will to Power. The Will to Power is a force by which one “discharges" ones "strength;” a living thing becoming powerful in way that it becomes itself.

In the English language, it is easy to perceive the word “power” as necessarily the domination over another. This is not what Nietzsche means by Will to Power. Instead, the Will to Power is more in tune with the idea of becoming oneself; a growth of one's own character and self.

One example that explicates Nietzsche's argument against survival-of-the-fittest is the following: 

If a meteor were to hit the Earth, it is more likely humanity will perish than beetles. But if self-preservation were the fundamental aim, then one can argue humanity is "below" the beetle. But today, humanity clearly has more capacity for growth and opportunity than these bugs. Therefore, self-preservation cannot be the final aim. The final aim must be about maximizing power and growth, and it is only a consequence of this power that we, humans, are still alive.

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Psychologists should bethink themselves before putting down the instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic being.

As regards materialistic atomism, it is one of the best-refuted theories that have been advanced, and in Europe there is now perhaps no one in the learned world so unscholarly as to attach serious signification to it, except for convenient everyday use (as an abbreviation of the means of expression)—thanks chiefly to the Pole Boscovich: he and the Pole Copernicus have hitherto been the greatest and most successful opponents of ocular evidence. For while Copernicus has persuaded us to believe, contrary to all the senses, that the earth does NOT stand fast, Boscovich has taught us to abjure the belief in the last thing that "stood fast" of the earth—the belief in "substance," in "matter," in the earth-residuum, and particle-atom: it is the greatest triumph over the senses that has hitherto been gained on earth. 

Nietzsche cites Copernicus and Boscovich as theoreticians who convinced humanity to contradict their own senses. We experience the world as non-moving, and yet Copernicus tells us the earth is perpetually in motion. We experience things around us as unities, and Boscovich convinces us that everything is made of particle atoms. Without sufficient evidence, how are we to accept these ideas? 

One must, however, go still further, and also declare war, relentless war to the knife, against the "atomistic requirements" which still lead a dangerous after-life in places where no one suspects them, like the more celebrated "metaphysical requirements": one must also above all give the finishing stroke to that other and more portentous atomism which Christianity has taught best and longest, the SOUL-ATOMISM. Let it be permitted to designate by this expression the belief which regards the soul as something indestructible, eternal, indivisible, as a monad, as an atomon: this belief ought to be expelled from science! 

The idea of atomism, which contradicts our senses and experience, leads to dangerous convictions. Christianity atomizes the soul and tells us our souls are “indestructible, eternal, indivisible." And yet, they have no evidence to back up their claim; no sensual data to convince us. It should be made explicit that this is not science.

Between ourselves, it is not at all necessary to get rid of "the soul" thereby, and thus renounce one of the oldest and most venerated hypotheses—as happens frequently to the clumsiness of naturalists, who can hardly touch on the soul without immediately losing it. But the way is open for new acceptations and refinements of the soul-hypothesis; and such conceptions as "mortal soul," and "soul of subjective multiplicity," and "soul as social structure of the instincts and passions," want henceforth to have legitimate rights in science. 

We don't need to renounce the idea of the soul entirely. We can refine it based on grounded ideas: mortality, subjectivity, instincts, passions. 

In that the NEW psychologist is about to put an end to the superstitions which have hitherto flourished with almost tropical luxuriance around the idea of the soul, he is really, as it were, thrusting himself into a new desert and a new distrust—it is possible that the older psychologists had a merrier and more comfortable time of it; eventually, however, he finds that precisely thereby he is also condemned to INVENT—and, who knows? perhaps to DISCOVER the new.

This re-conception of the soul will produce new psychologists who are no longer disillusioned with the Christian soul. The soul will be based instead on the human psyche. These new psychologists are upon a new horizon of invention and discovery.

Nietzsche doesn't explicitly point to who these new psychologists could be, but during this writing, Freud and Jung were already making discoveries in then ew field of psychoanalysis.

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As regards materialistic atomism, it is one of the best-refuted theories that have been advanced, and in Europe there is now perhaps no one in the learned world so unscholarly as to attach serious signification to it, except for convenient everyday use (as an abbreviation of the means of expression)

Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil: The Hard Way (012)

It seems to me that there is everywhere an attempt at present to divert attention from the actual influence which Kant exercised on German philosophy, and especially to ignore prudently the value which he set upon himself. Kant was first and foremost proud of his Table of Categories; with it in his hand he said: "This is the most difficult thing that could ever be undertaken on behalf of metaphysics." 

 (1724–1804) is considered one of the most (if not the most), influential philosophers of all-time. Many philosophers after Kant based their entire philosophies on Kant's Table of Categories, hence entire cultures arose as result of Kant.

Nietzsche points out Kant had an abundant pride. Kant identifies his own work (the transcendental induction) as 

 the most difficult thing yet to be undertaken thus far in metaphysics. This induced enormous awe and stirred German pride.

Let us only understand this "could be"! He was proud of having DISCOVERED a new faculty in man, the faculty of synthetic judgment a priori. Granting that he deceived himself in this matter; the development and rapid flourishing of German philosophy depended nevertheless on his pride, and on the eager rivalry of the younger generation to discover if possible something—at all events "new faculties"—of which to be still prouder!—

Kant's pride is contagious for young philosophers. They believe that Kant's discovery of the faculty of synthetic judgement 

 the most important contribution to metaphysics. But, because it only 

 German philosophers threw themselves onto Kant's path in hopes of finding 

 most important contribution. Driven by their own pride, they set out to “discover” new apriori faculties, thereby continuing the work of Kant.

But let us reflect for a moment—it is high time to do so. "How are synthetic judgments a priori POSSIBLE?" Kant asks himself—and what is really his answer? "BY MEANS OF A MEANS (faculty)"—but unfortunately not in five words, but so circumstantially, imposingly, and with such display of German profundity and verbal flourishes, that one altogether loses sight of the comical niaiserie allemande involved in such an answer. People were beside themselves with delight over this new faculty, and the jubilation reached its climax when Kant further discovered a moral faculty in man—for at that time Germans were still moral, not yet dabbling in the "Politics of hard fact." 

Let's take a closer look at Kant's claim. How did he discovery synthetic judgement? He did so by a “means of a means (faculty)." However, Kant doesn't use five words to say this; he was garrulous! He wrote in profundity and appealed to the proud spirit of German overabundance and foolishness.

And when Kant saw the jubilation over his new faculty, he went one deeper: he announced the discovery of an even newer moral faculty! The German people must have been in awe over such an accomplishment!

Then came the honeymoon of German philosophy. All the young theologians of the Tubingen institution went immediately into the groves—all seeking for "faculties." And what did they not find—in that innocent, rich, and still youthful period of the German spirit, to which Romanticism, the malicious fairy, piped and sang, when one could not yet distinguish between "finding" and "inventing"! Above all a faculty for the "transcendental"; Schelling christened it, intellectual intuition, and thereby gratified the most earnest longings of the naturally pious-inclined Germans. One can do no greater wrong to the whole of this exuberant and eccentric movement (which was really youthfulness, notwithstanding that it disguised itself so boldly, in hoary and senile conceptions), than to take it seriously, or even treat it with moral indignation. Enough, however—the world grew older, and the dream vanished. A time came when people rubbed their foreheads, and they still rub them today. People had been dreaming, and first and foremost—old Kant. "By means of a means (faculty)"—he had said, or at least meant to say. But, is that—an answer? An explanation? Or is it not rather merely a repetition of the question? How does opium induce sleep? "By means of a means (faculty)," namely the virtus dormitiva, replies the doctor in Moliere,

Quia est in eo virtus dormitiva,
 Cujus est natura sensus assoupire.


You could say the idea of “faculties” went viral. All German philosophers aimed their studies at the discovery of new “faculties,” and this is all due to Kant. However, over time, the idea of faculty waned. Soon the German people regained their wits and returned to the basic idea Kant laid before them: “By means of a means." And now looking at it with new eyes, they saw that the answer Kant provided was simply a restatement of the question itself; nothing more.

For example, why does opium induce sleep? The physician Moliere replies in a Kantian way: “Because there is a dormative faculty in it, whose nature is to put the senses to sleep." By simply stating a faculty exists for the function is in some way comedic. 

But such replies belong to the realm of comedy, and it is high time to replace the Kantian question, "How are synthetic judgments a PRIORI possible?" by another question, "Why is belief in such judgments necessary?"—in effect, it is high time that we should understand that such judgments must be believed to be true, for the sake of the preservation of creatures like ourselves; though they still might naturally be false judgments! Or, more plainly spoken, and roughly and readily—synthetic judgments a priori should not "be possible" at all; we have no right to them; in our mouths they are nothing but false judgments. Only, of course, the belief in their truth is necessary, as plausible belief and ocular evidence belonging to the perspective view of life. 

Instead of asking "how are synthetic judgements 

 possible?", we should instead ask, “why are these judgements necessary?" These judgements are only necessary for those Germans who believe them to be necessary! It doesn't matter whether they are “true” or “false.” In the end, it comes down the a conviction, a wanting to believe.

And finally, to call to mind the enormous influence which "German philosophy"—I hope you understand its right to inverted commas (goosefeet)?—has exercised throughout the whole of Europe, there is no doubt that a certain VIRTUS DORMITIVA had a share in it; thanks to German philosophy, it was a delight to the noble idlers, the virtuous, the mystics, the artiste, the three-fourths Christians, and the political obscurantists of all nations, to find an antidote to the still overwhelming sensualism which overflowed from the last century into this, in short—"sensus assoupire."...

So what did Kant achieve? He gave German philosophy a means for defeating sensualism. By claiming the essence of the universe lies in these synthetic apriori judgements (in reason), he gave an answer that comforted the “noble idlers, the virtous, the mystics, the artiste..." He gave them a reason to continue to live by their own prejudices and convictions.

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It seems to me that there is everywhere an attempt at present to divert attention from the actual influence which Kant exercised on German philosophy, and especially to ignore prudently the value which he set upon himself.

The eagerness and subtlety, I should even say craftiness, with which the problem of "the real and the apparent world" is dealt with at present throughout Europe, furnishes food for thought and attention; and he who hears only a "Will to Truth" in the background, and nothing else, cannot certainly boast of the sharpest ears. In rare and isolated cases, it may really have happened that such a Will to Truth—a certain extravagant and adventurous pluck, a metaphysician's ambition of the forlorn hope—has participated therein: that which in the end always prefers a handful of "certainty" to a whole cartload of beautiful possibilities; there may even be puritanical fanatics of conscience, who prefer to put their last trust in a sure nothing, rather than in an uncertain something. But that is Nihilism, and the sign of a despairing, mortally wearied soul, notwithstanding the courageous bearing such a virtue may display. 

How should one cope with the world? It seems silly to think that we all view the world as, in some way, broken. How do we fix this broken world?

Historically, we've "fixed" the world using our "Will to Truth," which aims to discover certainties about the world. Truth is out there to be discovered. But why not aim for possibilities/uncertainty instead? 

If we are set on defining the world as a certainty, then we are seeking some kind of stabilization; A way to prevent future possibilities. But if we were living a thriving life, why would we care for stability? Wouldn't we instead want to maximize opportunity?

We are so obsessed with certainty that some people rather opt for a "certain nothing." This is Nihilism and much of Nietzsche's philosophy is aimed at overcoming this.

It seems, however, to be otherwise with stronger and livelier thinkers who are still eager for life. In that they side AGAINST appearance, and speak superciliously of "perspective," in that they rank the credibility of their own bodies about as low as the credibility of the ocular evidence that "the earth stands still," and thus, apparently, allowing with complacency their securest possession to escape (for what does one at present believe in more firmly than in one's body?),—who knows if they are not really trying to win back something which was formerly an even securer possession, something of the old domain of the faith of former times, perhaps the "immortal soul," perhaps "the old God," in short, ideas by which they could live better, that is to say, more vigorously and more joyously, than by "modern ideas"? 

There are some that appear to side heavily against certainty. They give up the most certain things: appearance, their own bodies. But how do we know they aren't secretly tending towards something that is even more certain? A certain idealism?

Take for instance Plato. He denies the world's appearance as a false representation. Instead, the real world is the World of Forms, an idealistic realm of Truth. The same goes for Christianity. The faith professes this world to be full of sin. And we must repent in order to enter the real world: the kingdom of God. The common thread between these ideologies is the rejection of 

There is DISTRUST of these modern ideas in this mode of looking at things, a disbelief in all that has been constructed yesterday and today; there is perhaps some slight admixture of satiety and scorn, which can no longer endure the BRIC-A-BRAC of ideas of the most varied origin, such as so-called Positivism at present throws on the market; a disgust of the more refined taste at the village-fair motleyness and patchiness of all these reality-philosophasters, in whom there is nothing either new or true, except this motleyness. 

The philosophers who deny the world (in search for some more perfect world), also deny modern philosophies, which assert new ideas about this world. They are so caught up in their own ideal systems that they feel disgust at the slightest indication of "reality."

Therein it seems to me that we should agree with those skeptical anti-realists and knowledge-microscopists of the present day; their instinct, which repels them from MODERN reality, is unrefuted... what do their retrograde by-paths concern us! The main thing about them is NOT that they wish to go "back," but that they wish to get AWAY therefrom. A little MORE strength, swing, courage, and artistic power, and they would be OFF—and not back!

These anti-realists condemn modern ideas because the modern ideas attempt to, in some way, assert truth about 

 world, to the anti-realists, is only an illusion. These thinkers don't wish to go back to a time during which God roamed the land. Instead, they wish to escape this world itself.

We will learn later that one of Nietzsche's aims is to assert 

Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil: The Hard Way (010)


The eagerness and subtlety, I should even say craftiness, with which the problem of "the real and the apparent world" is dealt with at present throughout Europe, furnishes food for thought and attention;

You desire to LIVE "according to Nature"? Oh, you noble Stoics, what fraud of words! Imagine to yourselves a being like Nature, boundlessly extravagant, boundlessly indifferent, without purpose or consideration, without pity or justice, at once fruitful and barren and uncertain: imagine to yourselves INDIFFERENCE as a power—how COULD you live in accordance with such indifference? To live—is not that just endeavouring to be otherwise than this Nature? Is not living valuing, preferring, being unjust, being limited, endeavouring to be different? And granted that your imperative, "living according to Nature," means actually the same as "living according to life"—how could you do DIFFERENTLY? Why should you make a principle out of what you yourselves are, and must be? 

 is to “live according to Nature." Nature, however, is not well defined by the Stoics. For an explanation of Nature, I recommend watching 

Living in accordance to Nature doesn't mean living by a moral code defined by some external divinity. Instead, Nature can be thought of as the wholistic, natural flow underlying the cosmos. It is, in some way, an acceptance of Fate, and Fate is indifferent.

Nietzsche therefore criticizes Stoicism for claiming to live in accordance to indifference: How can you live in accordance to something and also be indifferent of it? This is a contradiction that leads Nietzsche to conclude that Stoics are merely living according to themselves. They are not living towards some objective, truth called Nature; they are living based on their own values.

In reality, however, it is quite otherwise with you: while you pretend to read with rapture the canon of your law in Nature, you want something quite the contrary, you extraordinary stage-players and self-deluders! In your pride you wish to dictate your morals and ideals to Nature, to Nature herself, and to incorporate them therein; you insist that it shall be Nature "according to the Stoa," and would like everything to be made after your own image, as a vast, eternal glorification and generalism of Stoicism! With all your love for truth, you have forced yourselves so long, so persistently, and with such hypnotic rigidity to see Nature FALSELY, that is to say, Stoically, that you are no longer able to see it otherwise—and to crown all, some unfathomable superciliousness gives you the Bedlamite hope that BECAUSE you are able to tyrannize over yourselves—

Stoicism pretends to live according to the “law of Nature." But this is only a trickster device used in order to cast the world in their own image. The Stoics don't follow “Nature," they follow the “Nature according to the Stoas." 

Again, Nietzsche is attacking past philosophies that professed a way of living that is in alignment to some fundamental natural law, but all such philosophies are polluted with prejudice and conviction.

Stoicism is self-tyranny—Nature will also allow herself to be tyrannized over: is not the Stoic a PART of Nature?... But this is an old and everlasting story: what happened in old times with the Stoics still happens today, as soon as ever a philosophy begins to believe in itself. It always creates the world in its own image; it cannot do otherwise; philosophy is this tyrannical impulse itself, the most spiritual Will to Power, the will to "creation of the world," the will to the causa prima.

Nietzsche reiterates the idea of philosophy being tyrannical. Once a philosophy has “found” some fundamental truth, it dogmatically applies this rule to everything. Stoicism is no different: they form Nature in the image of their own wise principles, and then they wish to form themselves into the image of that image they created. And by induction, the philosophy forms everything in its own image.

If you are more interested in this subject, I recommend watching Dr. Gregory Sadler's response to Nietzsche's criticism of Stoicism:

While Nietzsche doesn't “refute” Stoicism, I think his broader attack still holds water. Many philosophies, including Stoicism, claim to be founded on some pure, objective truth; however Nietzsche is trying to show us that behind every “truth," lies a conviction. And I believe Stoicism is no exception.


You desire to LIVE "according to Nature"? Oh, you noble Stoics, what fraud of words! Imagine to yourselves a being like Nature, boundlessly extravagant, boundlessly indifferent, without purpose or consideration, without pity or justice, at once fruitful and barren and uncertain: imagine to yourselves INDIFFERENCE as a power

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There is a point in every philosophy at which the "conviction" of the philosopher appears on the scene; or, to put it in the words of an ancient mystery: Adventavit asinus, Pulcher et fortissimus.

The latin translation reads “the ass arrived/beautiful and strong." It originates from the 

The Flight into Egypt is a biblical story in which an angel appears before Joseph and warns that King Herod has a plan to kill Jesus. In response to the news, Joseph, Mary, and Jesus escape to Egypt.

The flight of Egypt is usually depicted in medieval art with Mary and Jesus riding on an ass.

On the day of the Feast of the Ass, a woman and child traditionally ride into town on a donkey. Eventually they arrive at the church for mass. During mass, the donkey stands by the altar with the priest, who gives the sermon. During the mass, “amen" is sometimes replaced by “Y-a." And at the end of the service, the priest will bray to the mass.

I (rob) am not confident why Nietzsche brings this up, but here is my hypothesis:

, Nietzsche refers to asses in a couple instances:

So, to bring it back to Beyond Good and Evil, when the ass appears, it is the value-laden conviction of the philosopher. And it should be seen as silly and foolish; as a priest saying “Y-a” and braying in front of hundreds of people during a church sermon. But this foolishness is also a necessary some; some require such festivities.


There is a point in every philosophy at which the "conviction" of the philosopher appears on the scene; or, to put it in the words of an ancient mystery: Adventavit asinus, Pulcher et fortissimus.